Israel Palestine Infos
Uri Avnery
June 12, 2010
Who
is Afraid of a real Inquiry?
If a real Commission of
Inquiry had been set up (instead of the pathetic excuse for a commission), here
are some of the questions it should have addressed:
1. What is the real aim
of the
2. If the aim is to
prevent the flow of arms into the Strip, why are only 100 products allowed in
(as compared to the more than 12 thousand products in an average Israeli
supermarket)?
3. Why is it forbidden to
bring in chocolate, toys, writing material, many kinds of fruits and vegetables
(and why cinnamon but not coriander)?
4. What is the connection
between the decision to forbid the import of construction materials for the
replacement or repair of the thousands of buildings destroyed or damaged during
the Cast Lead operation and the argument that they may serve Hamas for building
bunkers – when more than enough materials for this purpose are brought into the
Strip through the tunnels?
5. Is the real aim of the
blockade to turn the lives of the 1.5 million human beings in the Strip into
hell, in the hope of inducing them to overthrow the Hamas regime?
6. Since this has not
happened, but – on the contrary – Hamas has become stronger during the three
years of the blockade, did the government ever entertain second thoughts on this
matter?
7. Has the blockade been
imposed in the hope of freeing the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit?
8. If so, has the
blockade contributed anything to the realization of this aim, or has it been
counter-productive?
9. Why does the Israeli
government refuse to exchange Shalit for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, when
Hamas agrees to such a deal?
10. Is it true that the
US government has imposed a veto on the exchange of prisoners, on the grounds
that it would strengthen Hamas?
11. Has there been any
discussion in our government about fulfilling its undertaking in the
12. Why does the Israeli
government declare again and again that the territorial waters of the Gaza strip
are part of Israel’s own territorial waters, and that ships entering them
“infringe on Israeli sovereignty”, contrary to the fact that the Gaza Strip was
never annexed to Israel and that Israel officially announced in 2006 that it had
“separated” itself from it?
13. Why has the Attorney
General’s office declared that the peace activists captured on the high seas,
who had no intention whatsoever of entering Israel, had “tried to enter Israel
illegally”, and brought them before a judge for the extension of their arrest
under the law that concerns “illegal entry into Israel”?
14. Who is responsible
for these contradictory legal claims, when the Israeli government argues one
minute that Israel has “separated itself from the Gaza Strip” and that the
“occupation there has come to an end” – and the next minute claims sovereignty
over the coastal waters of the Strip?
Question concerning the
decision to attack the flotilla:
15. When did the
preparation for this flotilla become known to the Israeli intelligence services?
(Evidence on this may be heard in camera.)
16. When was this brought
to the attention of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Cabinet,
the Committee of Seven (in charge of security matters) and the IDF Chief of
Staff? (ditto)
17. What were the
deliberations of these officials and institutions? (ditto)
18. What intelligence was
submitted to each of them? (ditto)
19. When, by whom and how
was the decision taken to stop the flotilla by force?
20. Is it true that the
secretary of the cabinet, Tzvi Hauser, warned of the severe consequences of such
action and advised letting the flotilla sail to
21. Were there others who
also advised doing so?
22. Was the Foreign
Ministry a full partner in all the discussions?
23. If so, did the
Foreign Ministry warn of the impact of such an action on our relations with
25. Was due consideration
given to the alternative of stopping the flotilla in territorial waters,
inspecting the cargo for arms and letting it sail on?
26. Was the impact of the
action on international public opinion considered?
27. Was the impact of the
action on our relations with the
28. Was it taken into
consideration that the action may actually strengthen Hamas?
29. Was it taken into
consideration that the action may make the continuation of the blockade more
difficult?
Question concerning the
planning of the action:
30. What intelligence was
at the disposal of the planners? (Evidence may be heard in camera.)
31. Was it considered
that the composition of the group of activists in this flotilla was different
from that in earlier protest ships, because of the addition of the Turkish
component?
32. Was it taken into
consideration that contrary to the European peace activists, who believe in
passive resistance, the Turkish activists may adopt a policy of active
resistance to soldiers invading a Turkish ship?
33. Were alternative
courses of action considered, such as blocking the progress of the flotilla with
navy boats?
34. If so, what were the
alternatives considered, and why were they rejected?
35. Who was responsible
for the actual planning of the operation – the IDF Chief of Staff or the
Commander of the Navy?
36. If it was the Navy
Commander who decided on the method employed, was the decision approved by the
Chief of Staff, the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister?
37. How were the
responsibilities for planning divided between these?
38. Why was the action
undertaken outside of the territorial waters of
39. Why was it executed
in darkness?
40. Did anyone in the
navy object to the idea of soldiers descending from helicopters onto the deck of
the ship “Mavi Marmara”?
41. During the
deliberations, did anyone bring up the similarity between the planned operation
and the British action against the ship “Exodus
Questions concerning the
action itself:
42. Why was the flotilla
cut off from any contact with the world throughout the operation, if there was
nothing to hide?
43. Did anyone protest
that the soldiers were actually being sent into a trap?
44. Was it taken into
consideration that the plan adopted would place the soldiers for several
critical minutes in a dangerously inferior position?
45. When exactly did the
soldiers start to shoot live ammunition?
46. Which of the soldiers
was the first to fire?
47. Was the shooting –
all or part of it – justified?
48 Is it true that the
soldiers started firing even before descending onto the deck, as asserted by the
passengers?
49. Is it true that the
fire continued even after the captain of the ship and the activists announced
several times over loudspeakers that the ship had surrendered, and after they
had actually hoisted white flags?
50.
Is it true that five of the nine people killed were shot in the back, indicating
that they were trying to get away from the soldiers and thus could not be
endangering their lives?
51. Why was the killed
man Ibrahim Bilgen, 61 years old and father of six and a candidate for mayor in
his home town, described as a terrorist?
52. Why was the killed
man Cetin Topcoglu, 54 years old, trainer of the Turkish national taekwondo
(Korean martial arts) team, whose wife was also on the ship, described as a
terrorist?
53. Why was the killed
man Cevdet Kiliclar, a 38 year old journalist, described as a terrorist?
54. Why was the killed
man Ali Haydar Bengi, father of four, graduate of the al-Azhar school for
literature in
55. Why were the killed
men Necdet Yaldirim, 32 years old, father of a daughter; Fahri Yaldiz, 43 years
old, father of four; Cengiz Songur, 47 years old, father of seven; and Cengiz
Akyuz, 41 years old, father of three, described as terrorists?
56. Is it a lie that the
activists took a pistol from a soldier and shot him with it, as described by the
IDF, or is it true that the activists did in fact throw the pistol into the sea
without using it?
57. Is it true, as stated
by Jamal Elshayyal, a British subject, that the soldiers prevented treatment for
the Turkish wounded for three hours, during which time several of them died?
58.. Is it true, as
stated by this journalist, that he was handcuffed behind his back and forced to
kneel for three hours in the blazing sun, that he was not allowed to go and
urinate and told to “piss in his pants”, that
he remained handcuffed for 24 hours without water, that his British
passport was taken from him and not returned; that his laptop computer, three
cellular telephones and 1500 dollars in cash were taken from him and not
returned?
59. Did the IDF cut off
the passengers from the world for 48 hours and confiscate all the cameras, films
and cell phones of the journalists on board in order to suppress any information
that did not conform to the IDF story?
60. Is it a standing
procedure to keep the Prime Minister (or his acting deputy, Moshe Yaalon in this
case) in the picture during an operation, was this procedure implemented, and
was it implemented in previous cases, such as the Entebbe operation or the
boarding of the ship “Karin A”?
Questions concerning the
behavior of the IDF Spokesman:
61. IS it true that the
IDF Spokesman spread a series of fabrications during the first few hours, in
order to justify the action in the eyes of both the Israeli and the
international public?
62. Are the few minutes
of film which have been shown hundreds of times on Israeli TV, from the first
day on until now, a carefully edited clip, so that it is not seen what happened
just before and just after?
63. What is the truth of
the assertion that the soldiers who were taken by the activists into the
interior of the ship were about to be “lynched”, when the photos clearly show
that they were surrounded for a considerable time by dozens of activists without
being harmed, and that a doctor or medic from among the activists even treated
them?
64. What evidence is
there for the assertion that the Turkish NGO called IHH has connections with
al-Qaeda?
65. On what grounds was
it stated again and again that it was a “terrorist organization”, though no
evidence for this claim was offered?
66. Why was it asserted
that the association was acting under the orders of Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, when in fact it is close to an opposition party?
67. If it was in fact a
terrorist organization known to the Israeli intelligence services, why was this
not taken into account during the planning of the operation?
68. Why did the Israeli
government not announce this before the attack on the flotilla?
69. Why were the words of
one of the activists, who declared on his return that he wanted to be a
“shahid”, translated by official propaganda in a manifestly dishonest manner, as
if he had said that he wanted “to kill and be killed” (“shahid” means a person
who sacrifices his life in order to testify to his belief in God, much like a
Christian martyr)?
70. What is the source of
the lie that the Turks called out “Go back to
71. Why were the Israeli
doctors not called to inform the public at once about the character of the
wounds of the injured soldiers, after it was announced that at least one of them
was shot?
72. Who invented the
story that there were arms on the ship, and that they had been thrown into the
sea?
73. Who invented the
story that the activists had brought with them deadly weapons – when the
exhibition organized by the IDF Spokesman himself showed nothing but tools found
on any ship, including binoculars, a blood infusion instrument, knives and axes,
as well as decorative Arab daggers and kitchen knives that are to be found on
every ship, even one not equipped for 1000 passengers?
74. Do all these items –
coupled with the endless repetition of the word “terrorists” and the blocking of
any contrary information – not constitute brainwashing?
Questions concerning the
inquiry:
75. Why does the Israeli
government refuse to take part in an international board of inquiry, composed of
neutral personalities acceptable to them?
76. Why have the Prime
Minister and the Minister of Defense announced that they are ready to testify -
but not to answer questions?
77. Where does the
argument come from that soldiers must not be called to testify – when in all
previous investigations senior officers, junior officers and enlisted men were
indeed subjected to questioning?
78. Why does the
government refuse to appoint a State Commission of Inquiry under the Israeli law
that was enacted by the Knesset in 1966 for this very purpose, especially in
view of the fact that such commissions were appointed after the Yom Kippur war,
after the Sabra and Shatila massacre, after the podium of the al-Aqsa Mosque was
set on fire by an insane Australian, as well as to investigate corruption in
sport and the murder of the Zionist leader Chaim Arlosoroff (some fifty years
after it occurred!)?
79. Does the government
have something to fear from such a commission, whose members are appointed by
the President of the Supreme Court, and which is empowered to summon witnesses
and cross-examine them, demand the production of documents and determine the
personal responsibility for mistakes and crimes?
80. Why was it decided in
the end to appoint a pathetic committee, devoid of any legal powers, which will
lack all credibility both in Israel and abroad?
And, finally, the
question of questions:
81. What is our political
and military leadership trying to hide?